Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc.: A Restrictive Constitutional View of the Proselytizing Rights of Religious Organizations by Greenburg, Michael M.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 6
1-15-1982
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness Inc.: A Restrictive Constitutional
View of the Proselytizing Rights of Religious
Organizations
Michael M. Greenburg
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence
Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael M. Greenburg Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc.: A Restrictive Constitutional View of the Proselytizing
Rights of Religious Organizations , 9 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (1982)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol9/iss2/6
Hefiron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness Inc.: A Restrictive Constitutional
View of the Proselytizing Rights of
Religious Organizations
The persistent efforts of religious organizations to reach their public have
consistently been met with governmental limitation due to the often con-
flicting interests of public order, and free speech and expression. Heffron
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. represents the
Court's latest redefinition of the extent of permissible limitations upon the
activities of these groups.
The author examines the decision in light of the traditional criteria for
permissible time, place, and manner restrictions upon free speech and
evaluates the Court's implementation of these restrictions with respect to
the activities of the Krishna group. The impact of the decision upon the
limitations involved and upon similar future litigation is also explored.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1981, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness
Inc.' The case involved a challenge by members of the Krishna
religion to the constitutional validity of a Minnesota state fair
rule2 which required all commercial, charitable, and religious or-
ganizations to sell or distribute literature and solicit donations
only from assigned locations on the fairgrounds. The Court ruled
that the regulation was a fair time, place, and manner restriction
upon the respondent's constitutional rights and, therefore, did not
violate the first or fourteenth amendments.3
To gain an understanding of the contentions asserted by the In-
ternational Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), it is
necessary to briefly examine the nature and origin of the Krishna
religion and explore the rituals which are relevant to this litiga-
tion.4 The Krishna movement as it exists in this country was
1. 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
2. MINNESOTA STATE FAim RULE 6.05.
3. Since the case was largely concerned with restrictions upon the dissemi-
nation of printed materials, the Court primarily based its analysis on the freedom
of speech guarantee of the first amendment. See note 24 infra and accompanying
text.
4. It is clear that Krishna Consciousness is a "religion" for purposes of first
amendment analysis. Its members adhere to a strict set of theological doctrines
which govern many aspects of their lifestyles and beliefs. Historical evidence also
founded in 1966 by A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada.5 His
goal was to open a religious center in the United States espousing
the theological beliefs of his Spiritual Master in India.6 The life-
styles and rituals exhibited by members of Krishna Conscious-
ness find their origin in the Chaitanya 7 movement and encompass
modifications in physical appearance, diet, and theological beliefs,
all reflections of devotion to their Lord.8 Among the more preva-
lent rituals performed by members of the Krishna sect and cen-
tral to this case is the practice known as Sankirtan. 9 The exercise
of Sankirtan, as performed by the American Krishna group, in-
volves various forms of public chanting coupled with the distribu-
tion or sale of religious literature or the active solicitation of
donations for the support of Krishna Consciousness. 0 The goals
of this practice are to attract new members to the group, and to
strengthen the existing members' faith." It is the practice of
Sankirtan which Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 (Rule 6.05), the
regulation under scrutiny in this case, seeks to restrict.
This article explores the history of constitutional actions re-
garding the proselytizing rights of religious organizations, and ex-
amines the Court's analysis in finding Rule 6.05 constitutionally
valid in Heffron. Inquiry will be made from the standpoint of first
amendment rights and standards applied for permissible restric-
tions upon those rights. The opposing views taken by the dissent-
ing Justices with regard to their analysis of the application of
Rule 6.05 will then be discussed. Finally, the impact of the
Court's ruling upon the groups and organizations frequently en-
gaged in solicitation and distribution of literature will be
evaluated.
reveals the roots of the philosophy, which further demonstrates the "religious" na-
ture of the belief. International Soc'y for Krishna Consc., Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d
430, 440 (2nd Cir. 1981). See also Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Developmen4 Part I, Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1381, 1423-31 (1967); see notes 5-8 infra and accompanying text.
5. Bhaktiedanta Swami Prabhupada was eleventh in a chain of disciples of
Sage Chaitanya, who was believed by his followers to be an incarnation of God or
Krishna. 650 F.2d at 433.
6. J. JUDAH, HARE KRISHNA AND THE COUNTERCULTURE 40-43 (1974).
7. Krishna philosophy falls under the broad classification of the Vaishava
Tradition of Bhakti Hinduism and is an outgrowth of the Chaitanya movement of
Bengal. Id. at 18, 37, 38.
8. Id. at 36-37; see generally id. at 79-97.
9. Id. at 177. See also 101 S. Ct. at 2562. The development of Sankirtan as a
religious ritual can be traced to the Srimad Bhagavatam in the ninth century A.D..
In its original form Sankirtan involved congregational chanting and highly stylized
dancing intended to bring the group closer to God and to invoke similar behavior
in others. 650 F.2d at 433.
10. 101 S. Ct. at 2562; J. JUDAH, supra note 6, at 3, 92-93.
11. J. JUDAH, supra note 6, at 36, 37, & 162-163.
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II. HISTORY OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
Objection to Rule 6.05 by ISKCON arose in the context of the
Rule's application to a state fair12 operated by the Minnesota
Agricultural Society, a public corporation organized under the
laws of Minnesota. 13 The Rule provides that: "Sale or distribu-
tion of any merchandise, including printed or written material, ex-
cept under license issued [by] the Society and/or from a duly-
licensed location, shall be a misdemeanor."14 The policy behind
application of the Rule was to restrict the sales and distribution of
all literature and the solicitation of gifts and donations to fixed lo-
cations on the fairgrounds.15 The Agricultural Society did not dis-
criminate against any group or organization seeking space for
12. The fair, conducted for the exhibition of Minnesota's resources, including
agriculture, stock breeding, mining, etc., is generally recognized as a major public
event which attracts visitors from all parts of the State as well as surrounding re-
gions. The average total attendance for the past five-year period, of the twelve-day
fair, was 1,320,000 persons. 101 S. Ct. at 2561.
13. See MIn. STAT. § 37.01. See also MINN. STAT. § 37.16, which authorized the
Society to make any rules and regulations which it deemed necessary for the
proper operation of the fair.
14. 101 S. Ct. at 2561. Subsequent to this litigation, Rule 6.05 was replaced by
MINNESOTA STATE FAIR RULE 1.11 which provides:
The sale, posting or distribution of merchandise, products, promotional
items and printed or written materials except from a fixed location on the
fairgrounds approved by the Space Rental Department Superintendent
shall be prohibited. Those merchandise, products, promotional items and
printed or written materials which are authorized by the Space Rental De-
partment Superintendent for sale or distribution from a fixed location
shall not be handed out to any State Fair patron unless requested by that
patron.
Id. Although not specifically enumerated in either rule, the regulation has also
been applied to restrict solicitation of donations as well. Brief for Petitioner, Hef-
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981). Tele-
phone interview with Kent G. Harbison, Counsel for petitioners (Sept. 17, 1981).
Litigation concerning similar restrictions has frequently ensued. See, e.g. 650 F.2d
at 434 (RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRI-
CULTURE AND MARKETS, § 350.16(j); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agric.
Soc'y, 628 F.2d 282, 284 (4th Cir. 1980) (MARYLAND STATE FAIR BOOTH RULE);
HYNES v. METROPOLiTAN GOV'T. OF NASHVILLE, 478 F. Supp. 9, 11 (M.D. TENN. 1979)
(RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR EXHIBITORS AT TENNESSEE STATE FAIR); Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414, 417 (S.D. Ohio 1977)
(OHIo DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, REG. 901-7-22); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Hays, 438 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (FLA. DE-
PARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, REG. 14-61.06).
15. 101 S. Ct. at 2562. The rule is not restrictive, however, of organizational
members walking about the fairgrounds and orally publicizing their beliefs among
patrons in a reasonable manner. Id.
canvassing activities, and booths were rented to all in a nondis-
criminatory manner on a first-come basis.
In August of 1977, the respondents, on behalf of themselves and
all members of ISKCON, brought suit under the United States
Code16 and the Minnesota Statutes.17 ISKCON sought a declara-
tory judgment that Rule 6.05 violated the first and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution. The repondents also sought in-
junctive relief to prohibit the enforcement of the Rule against
ISKCON members claiming that it suppressed the group's prac-
tice of Sankirtan. 18
B. Lower Court Treatment
At the trial court a temporary restraining order was issued
which prohibited the appellants from preventing members of
ISKCON from soliciting donations or distributing literature on
the fairgrounds. However, the court also enjoined members of
ISKCON from selling or attempting to sell any literature within
the fairgrounds except from designated locations rented for that
purpose. Upon a subsequent motion for summary judgment by
both parties to the litigation, the court found in favor of the appel-
lants,19 thus upholding the constitutionality of Rule 6.05.20
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower
court ruling and held that the rights asserted by the members of
ISKCON were unconstitutionally restricted by Rule 6.05 and its
application.21 The court reasoned that less drastic measures
could adequately have protected the State's interest in providing
an orderly public fairground, and concluded that Rule 6.05 was
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory. . .subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id. Nearly all suits attacking state regulations similar to Rule 6.05 are brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jones, Solicitation--Charitable and Religious, 31 BAYLOR
L. REV. 53, 61 (1979).
17. MINN. STAT. § 555.01 states in relevant part: "No action or proceeding shall
be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment is prayed for."
18. 101 S. Ct. at 2562.
19. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 82
n.4 (Minn. 1980).
20. The trial court relied upon the case of International Soc'y for Krishna
Consc. Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio 1977), where it was held that a
system of rented booths for canvassing purposes was the most efficient method of
easing the conflict between the free speech interests of ISKCON and the state in-
terest of providing controlled and organized crowd movement. 101 S. Ct. at 2562-63.
21. 299 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1980).
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simply too restrictive of constitutional rights.22
Recognizing the need for a workable solution to the lingering
question of the proper implementation of restrictions upon the
first amendment rights of organizations frequently engaged in
practices involving public contact, the United States Supreme
Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari. As a further basis
for accepting the writ, the Court noted the importance of the
troublesome constitutional issues presented and the necessity for
immediate reconciliation of the wide array of conflicting proposed
solutions as found in the various lower court decisions on the
subject.2 3
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
It is clear that the distribution and sale of literature together
with the active solicitation of donations is protected by the con-
cepts of freedom of speech and freedom of religion set forth in the
first amendment. 24 Nevertheless, such constitutionally protected
22. The court stated:
Even if we assume the importance of the state's interest in preventing the
disorder that will result from allowing members of ISKCON to distribute
or sell religious literature and receive donations in public areas of the fair-
grounds, we are not persuaded that application of Rule 6.05 to members of
ISKCON is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The state's inter.
est can be adequately served by means less restrictive of first amendment
rights.
Id. at 84. See note 61 infra.
23. 101 S. Ct. at 2563. The uncertainty of the courts in dealing with the issue is
clearly illustrated by a comparison of such cases as International Soc'y for
Krishna Consc., Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (1981) (ruling that confinement of can-
vassing activities to a booth is an invalid restriction); Edwards v. Maryland State
Fair and Agr. Soc., 628 F.2d 282 (1980) (same); International Soc'y for Krishna
Consc., Inc. v. Colorado State Fair and Indus. Expos., 610 P.2d 436 (Colo. 1980)
(same); with Hynes v. Metropolitan Govern. of Nashville, 478 F. Supp. 9 (1979)
(ruling that confinement of canvassing activities to a booth is a valid restriction);
International Soc'y for Krishna Consc., Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (1977)
(same). Although these cases deal primarily with members of the Krishna reli-
gion it must be noted that the rulings may not be narrowly construed so as to ap-
ply solely to that organization. It is clear that in choosing to hear the case, the
Supreme Court anticipated the creation of standards which apply to a wide range
of groups and activities. See notes 140-43 iqfra and accompanying text.
24. 101 S. Ct. at 2563. The first amendment to the Constitution is made appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), and provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. CONST.
amend. I. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939), where the Court pro-
claimed that the individual liberties to speak, write, print, or circulate information
or opinion must remain paramount to government regulation of such forms of
communication even in the interest of health, safety, and other public needs. See
523
expression has traditionally been subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions. 25 The requirement that such re-
strictions be implemented in a reasonable manner by the govern-
ment entity involved is often the decisive issue in determining the
outcome of disputes involving such regulations. Indeed, this issue
is determinitive to the effective scrutiny of the case under present
analysis. "
In holding that Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 did not place an
unreasonable restraint upon the respondent's constitutional
rights, the Heifron Court recognized that first amendment protec-
tions are not absolute guarantees functioning under every possi-
ble circumstance. 26 The Court relied upon the case of Cox v. New
310 U.S. at 303-04. The Cantwell Court expounded upon the fundamental nature of
the freedom to act in the pursuit of first amendment rights and the delicate man-
ner in which regulation of these rights must be implemented. "In every case the
power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, un-
duly to infringe the protected freedom." Id. at 304. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted Cantwell to suggest that the practice of soliciting donations involves
interests protected by the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envir., 444 U.S. 620, 629 (1979).
A large majority of the cases which form the constitutional thinking related to
literature distribution and sales, and solicitation of funds involve litigation insti-
tuted by members of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith. Giannella, supra note 4, at
1397; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT.
REV. 1 n.2. This fact is due in part to the readiness of the group to resort to the
courts for the protection of their rights, and their ability to finance such litigation.
P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw, 50 (1962).
25. 101 S. Ct. at 2563. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 304. See
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion stated: "While the court has empha-
sized the importance of 'free speech,' it has recognized that 'free speech' is not
unmindful of other important interests, such as public order.. ." He then consid-
ered four questions which the decisions implementing time, place, and manner re-
strictions appear to turn upon:
1) What is the interest deemed to require the regulation of speech?
2) What is the method used to achieve the protection of these interests?
3) What mode of speech is being regulated?
4) Where does the speech which is being regulated take place?
Implementation of such restrictive measures has often manifested itself in the
form of licensing schemes requiring an individual to first apply for a permit before
exercising first amendment rights in a public forum. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945) (statute requiring labor organizers to register with a state offi-
cial before soliciting members); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (permit
granted by city manager required before distributing printed material). Such ordi-
nances have generally not withstood constitutional attack. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth
v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, (1969); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Thomhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939). See
Giannella, supra note 4, at 1397. But see Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395
(1953), where the defendant applied for a license which was denied. There, the
Court found that although the city's refusal to grant the license was arbitrary and
unreasonable, the licensing ordinance itself was valid nonetheless. Id. at 409.
26. 101 S. Ct. at 2563. "Freedom of speech.., does not mean that one can talk
or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights other than those of the
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Hampshire27 and other similar decisions 28 to illustrate its recogni-
tion of the above mentioned time, place, and manner restrictions
with reference to the necessity of first amendment limitations in
certain situations.
With respect to Rule 6.05, the Court's task was to determine
whether the Agricultural Society could constitutionally confine
ISKCON's practice of Sankirtan to fixed locations within the fair-
grounds as a reasonable restriction of the communication of
Krishna beliefs. The approach which the Court adopted is clearly
stated in the opinion as a preface to Justice White's in-depth anal-
ysis. Quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council,29 the Heffron Court stated: "We have
often approved restrictions of that kind provided that they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so
doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion of the information." 30 Thus, the Court clearly delineated the
substantive standards to be applied in determining the constitu-
tionality of the restraint in question.
A. Restriction without Regard to Content of Speech
It is generally understood that reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions upon free speech may only be implemented on a
non-discriminatory, content-neutral basis.3 1 The Heffron Court
advocates are involved." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951). See also
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89
(1949); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
27. 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cox involved a constitutional attack upon the validity
of a state law prohibiting parades or processions upon public streets without a
special permit. The Court upheld the provision as promoting "the public conven-
ience in the interest of all ... ." Id. at 574.
28. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 355
U.S. 39 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
29. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. stands for the propo-
sition that commercial speech (in this case advertisements of prescription drugs
by a licensed pharmacist) is not wholly outside the protection of the first and four-
teenth amendments.
30. 101 S. Ct. at 2564.
31. Id. Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176
(1976); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) where the Court
stated: "[G I overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views." But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 429 U.S. 50 (1976).
The Young Court held that an ordinance regulating the location of adult movie
adopted this limitation upon speech restraints as its first criterion
for finding that Rule 6.05 was not an unconstitutional restriction.
In examining the facts and the specific language of Rule 6.05,
the Court observed that the restrictions placed upon the mem-
bers of ISKCON by the Rule were applied and enforced equally
against all organizations and groups wishing to espouse their be-
liefs at the fair.32 Each group was similarly required to conduct
any commercial or charitable canvassing from designated booths
rented for that purpose, and violation of this requirement was
dealt with in the same manner regardless of which particular or-
ganization happened to be involved.33
Equally persuasive to the Court was the fact that the method of
space allocation among those wishing to sell or distribute litera-
ture or solicit donations at the fair was on a first-come system.3 4
For this reason, the Court stipulated that Rule 6.05 could not be
attacked as being a capricious or otherwise unfair restraint of the
type which has so often been struck down as a discriminatory
limitation on free speech.35
The Court intimated that Rule 6.05 appeared to show no prefer-
ence for the beliefs or ideology of any organization against which
it was applied. The cases on the subject are replete with regula-
tions attempting to give state officials the unfettered discretion to
determine solely on the basis of content which forms and manner
of speech should be tolerated and which should not.36 Such regu-
lations have almost uniformly been invalidated as overly suppres-
theaters was a valid restriction notwithstanding the argument that the classifica-
tion was predicated upon the content of material shown in the respective theaters.
32. Among the other groups and organizations affected by Rule 6.05 at the 1978
Minnesota State Fair were: Abortion Rights Council of Minnesota, American As-
sociation of Retired Persons, American Heart Association, American Party of Min-
nesota, Christian Business Men's Association, Church of Christ, D.F.L. State
Central Committee, and Faith Broadcasting Network, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2562 n.5.
33. The Rule makes no delineation as to application or punishment according
to the nature of the organization involved. See note 14 supra and accompanying
text.
34. 101 S. Ct. at 2562.
35. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1964) (local officials given unfet-
tered discretion to regulate public streets for parades and meetings); Staub v. City
of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (solicitation for union, organizational, or societal
membership restricted at the discretion of mayor and council); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951) (discretionary power given to administrative official to control
the right of citizens to speak on religious matters); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943) (dissemination of religious publications contingent upon content approval
by mayor); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting), adopted
per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (restrictions on the sale of religious
literature on city streets in the form of a license, revocable at the unrestrained dis-
cretion of administrative officers).
36. 101 S. Ct. at 2564-65. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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sive of a particular point of view.37
The Court concluded that Rule 6.05 operated in an unbiased
fashion, restricting all organizations at the fair in the same man-
ner in which members of ISKCON were restricted, and that re-
spondent's contentions stating arguments to the contrary were
unpersuasive. 38
B. Rule 6.05 and the Governmental Interest
The second test utilized by the Heffron Court in its constitu-
tional analysis of Rule 6.05 was the requirement that a valid time,
place, and manner restriction serve a significant governmental in-
terest.39 The primary governmental interest recognized by the
majority as necessitating some form of speech restraint was the
"need to maintain the orderly movement of the crowd given the
large number of exhibitors and persons attending the Fair."40
Significant to the Court's determination of the legitimacy of the
governmental interest involved, was the character of the particu-
lar forum where the asserted regulation was intended to have its
effect.4 1 The Minnesota State Fair was held in a relatively small
37. Id.
38. The Court rejected an argument by respondents that the Rule, as applied
to them, was not in fact content-neutral because it required ISKCON members to
await an approach from an interested party before they would be permitted to dis-
tribute, sell, or solicit. The force of the argument was intended to show that the
Rule preferred listener-initiated exchanges to those originating with the speaker.
101 S. Ct. at 2564 n.12.
39. Id. at 2565.
40. Id. The Court also noted two additional State interests asserted by the pe-
titioners. The first involved a claim that Rule 6.05 was necessary for the protection
of fairgoers from fraudulent solications, false or misrepresentative speech, and un-
due annoyance. The second included contentions that the regulation offered
fairgoers protection from general harassment on the premise that they were es-
sentially a captive audience. Id. at 2565 n.13. Although the Court may have recog-
nized these interests as valid governmental objectives, it did indicate that its
decision was primarily based upon the crowd control interest. Id.
A somewhat related point was raised in a class of cases in which recipients of
information claimed a right not to hear a particular message. See, e.g., Rowan v.
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (sexually provocative mail sent out to public);
Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (broadcast of music, news, and
commercials on public transit buses); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (un-
wanted door-to-door solicitors). See generally Black, He cannot Choose but Hear:
the Plight of the Captive Auditor 53 CoLUM. L. REV. 960 (1953).
41. 101 S. Ct. at 2565. The special attributes of the place in question are always
relevant to a determination as to the need for regulation. Wright, The Constitution
on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1969).
area comprised of buildings, lots, and temporary structures. 42
During the course of the fair, a multitude of displays exhibited by
over 1400 concessionaires 43 were open to the public. In light of
the enormous array of exhibits and the necessary space con-
straints involved, the large crowds attracted to the function44 had
to be afforded an orderly plan of movement. The Court recog-
nized that absent restrictions upon the proselytizing rights of in-
dividuals representing the various groups in attendance, the goal
of providing order and control of fair patrons could not be
accomplished.
In addition to the goal of providing orderly crowd flow, the
Court relied upon the interest of the State in protecting the
"'safety and convenience' of persons using a public forum. . .."45
The Court inferred that not only did Rule 6.05 promote ease of
movement in an extremely compact area, but that such a degree
of order furthered the safety and comfort of all who were in at-
tendance. The Court used this to justify its conclusion that the
State's interest in providing organized movement of the fairgoers
was legitimate and worthy of protection.46
An argument asserted by the respondents in Heffron, which
was noted by the Court to be unfounded, is relevant to a study of
the nature and function of the State's interest and focused upon
an analogy between the fairgrounds and city streets.47 An oft
cited quote from the case of Hague v. C.I.O.,48 illustrates the
thrust of the assertion. The Hague Court stated: "Wherever the
title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions." 49 Utilizing the
facts of the instant case to show discrepancies in an analogy be-
tween public streets and the fairgrounds, the Heffiron Court dis-
carded the argument as "necessarily inexact."50 The Court
pointed out that city streets are basically a "relaxed environ-
ment," often "uncongested," and "continually open,"5' and inti-
42. 101 S. Ct. at 2565.
43. Id. See note 32 supra.
44. See note 12 supra.
45. 101 S. Ct. at 2565.
46. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
47. 101 S. Ct. at 2565.
48. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
49. Id. at 515. The Hague Court went on to hold, however, that such privileges
of citizens to speak in public streets and parks must necessarily be subordinate to
the general needs of the public. Id. at 515-16.
50. 101 S. Ct. at 2566.
51. Id. at 2565. But see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), where the
Court found necessary the regulation of parades or processions upon the public
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mated that restrictions upon free speech in such a context would
be unnecesssary. However, a state fair, the Court stressed,
presented a more pressing situation than a public highway be-
cause of the urgent demand for safety, the extent of crowd flow,
and the temporary nature of the activity.5 2 The Court concluded
that in light of all the circumstances Rule 6.05 did support a valid
governmental interest.
C. An Alternative View of the State Interest Measured by the
Sole Exemption of ISKCONfrom Rule 6.05
In examining the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion, the Hef-
fron Court noted that the significance of the State's interest in
the safety and orderly control of the fairgoers was recognized, as
was the necessity for protection of that interest.53 The Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision, however, stressed that the case did not
in fact turn upon the importance of the State's interest in provid-
ing order and safety, but upon the significance of the State's inter-
est in avoiding whatever disorder would likely result from
granting only members of ISKCON an exemption from the rule.5 4
Accordingly, that court concluded that a disruption of the kind re-
sulting from such an exemption was not sufficient to justify the
restriction in question.55
In reversing the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Heffron major-
ity discarded that court's analysis of the problem, insisting that a
view of the State's interest based solely upon ISKCON's activities
was too narrowly formulated. The Court reasoned that measuring
the validity of the Rule simply by the disorder resulting from an
exemption granted solely to ISKCON would be paramount to
granting that group and its activities special constitutional protec-
tions not available to other organizations utilizing similar meth-
ods of expression.5 6 The Court rejected claims that because the
streets as applied to a band of Jehovah's Witnesses who marched along city
streets. "Manchester had a population of over 75,000 in 1930 .... [On Saturday
nights in an hour's time 26,000 persons passed ... [through] the intersection
." Id. at 573.
52. 101 S. Ct. at 2565-66.
53. Id. at 2566. "We agree that these facts suggest a situation in which the
State's interest in maintaining order is substantial. We have no doubt that Rule
6.05's requirement... furthers that interest significantly." International Soc'y for
Krishna Consc., Inc. v. Heffron, 229 N.W.2d at 83.
54. Id.
55. See note 22 s-upra.
56. 101 S. Ct. at 2566.
practice of Sankirtan is included in the Krishna religion as a
church ritual and duty, the members of ISKCON should receive
canvassing rights beyond those of organizations which do not rit-
ualize the process. 5 7
The Court's opinion also recognized that solicitation rights of
religious organizations should not be given preference over simi-
lar rights asserted by social, political, or other nonreligious
groups. These secular groups, the Court stated, were entitled to
the same liberties and treatment granted to religious
organizations.5 8
The Court concluded that the State's interest in ensuring the
steady and safe flow of the crowd at the fair must be viewed from
the standpoint of the overwhelming disruption which could con-
ceivably result if all of the organizations represented at the fair
were allowed the exemption from Rule 6.05 to which ISKCON as-
serted it was entitled.59
D. The Validity of Rule 6.05 in Light of Less
Restrictive Alternatives
Utilizing the same reasoning employed to reject the alternative
view of the State's interest asserted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court,60 the Heffron Court similarly discarded arguments that, in
light of the existence of a variety of less restrictive measures
available to the State, Rule 6.05 became an unnecessary and
overly intrusive regulation of ISKCON's first amendment rights.61
In reaching this conclusion, the Court conceded the availability of
such alternative measures as the penalization of disorder or dis-
ruption, the possibility of more narrowly drawn restrictions on
the location and movement of canvassing, and limitations on the
number of canvassing participants. 62 The opinion reasoned, how-
57. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the argument that, since
Sankirtan is a fundamental aspect of the Krishna religion, it would be a violation
of the free exercise clause of the first amendment to interfere with its practice.
299 N.W.2d at 83 n.7. But see Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
where the Court intimated that one is not justified in breaking the law simply be-
cause a particular act happens to be included as a ritual or duty of his religion.
See notes 128-38 infra and accompanying text.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2566. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 615, 531 (1945).
59. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
60. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
61. 101 S. Ct. at 2567. The requirement that a governmental restriction upon
free speech be no more restrictive than is absolutely necessary is well established.
See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 125 (1976); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Richardson, Freedom of Expression and
the Function of the Courts, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6, 23-24 (1951).
62. 101 S. Ct. at 2567. Some further less intrusive means to accommodate the
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ever, that in the same way that analysis of the State's interest in
crowd control necessitated consideration of all organizatons in at-
tendance at the fair, so also must examination of the conse-
quences of imposing less intrusive measures consider all the
possible parties who would be affected. Analyzing the problem in
this way, the Court concluded that implementation of less restric-
tive measures than Rule 6.05 could not adequately deal with the
problems associated with the disruption which could result from
the free movement of, not only members of ISKCON but, individ-
uals representing all of the organizations attending the fair.63 The
Court noted the usefulness of such measures under the proper
circumstances, but recognized the futility of similar application to
the instant case.64
E. Other Forums Presenting an Opportunity to Be Heard
The Court cited as a final requirement to the constitutionality of
a time, place, and manner restriction, the availability of alterna-
tive locations in which the regulated speech or expression might
be communicated.65 As to this requirement, the Court stressed
that although Rule 6.05 regulated the activities of ISKCON within
the confines of the fairground, it had no force or effect outside of
this context.66 It was noted that notwithstanding the existence of
the Rule, ISKCON members were not prevented from carrying on
their religious practices outside the fairgrounds.67 The ultimate
result of this narrow application of the Rule was that ISKCON
members were free to contact the same group of people at the
gates, walkways, or parking lots surrounding the fairgrounds.68
State's interest such as the identification check of all organizational members and
the imposition of civil and criminal penalties for fraud or physical abuse, were
suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 299 N.W.2d at 85. The members of
ISKCON, although unwilling to confine their activities to a booth, did agree to lim-
itations upon their numbers in the fairgrounds. 299 N.W.2d at 84 n.9.
63. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), where the Court upheld a
"Green River ordinance" in a municipality which prohibited the practice of door-
to-door commercial solicitation without the prior consent of homeowners. The
Court found the ordinance to be prohibitory insofar as it restricted house-to-house
canvassing but gave more weight to the fact that it left open other conventional
mediums for communication such as newspapers, periodicals, mail, and radio. Id.
at 631-32.
The fact that Rule 6.05 did not represent an exclusion of ISK-
CON members from the fairgrounds further persuaded the
Court.69 Not only were these individuals free to walk about the
surrounding area communicating their views to the crowd,7 0 but
they were also permitted to conduct sales, solicitation, and distri-
bution practices from specified locations on the fairgrounds.71
Taking into consideration the limited function of the fair and
the nature of the area in which it is operated, the Court expressed
its unwillingness to conclude that Rule 6.05 deprived ISKCON
members of an adequate means to carry on their canvassing ac-
tivities. 72 The Court found that the availability of rented booths
presented all organizations sufficient opportunity to espouse their
religious beliefs through sales, distribution, and solicitation and
that the Rule could be totally avoided by conducting these re-
stricted activities outside of the fairgrounds.
IV. THE MINORITY OPINIONS
The separate opinion of Justice Brennan 73 centered upon the
governmental interests asserted by the petitioners and the legiti-
macy of Rule 6.05 in upholding that interest.74 The opinion ex-
pressed agreement with the majority's conclusion that the
interest of crowd control was indeed a significant state aim.75 It
also stipulated that the State had a legitimate interest in protect-
ing fairgoers from fraudulent or deceptive solicitation practices. 76
The opinion differed, however, with respect to its analysis of Rule
6.05 as a protection of those interests. 77
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
70. Id. The language of Rule 6.05 narrowly defines the type of behavior to be
restricted. The Rule expressly restricts only the sale and distribution of literature
and in no way can be construed to limit ISKCON's right to freely move about the
crowd and speak to fair patrons in any reasonable manner. See notes 14 and 15
supra and accompanying text.
71. 101 S. Ct. 2567. ISKCON claimed that the restriction imposed by Rule 6.05
was in effect a total ban of its first amendment rights. 101 S. Ct. at 2568 n.16. The
Court rejected this argument stating that, since the Rule did provide a means for
ISKCON members to carry on their activities, albiet from a fixed location, it could
not be said that the Rule acted as a blanket restriction on all expression. Id.
72. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
73. Justices Marshall and Stevens joined in the opinion. 101 S. Ct. at 2568
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
74. See generally id. at 2568-72.
75. Id. at 2568.
76. Id. The minority placed great weight on this justification while the major-
ity merely cited it in passing, making no determination as to its constitutional suf-
ficiency with regard to Rule 6.05. See note 40 supra. With regard to the "captive
audience" justification mentioned by the Court, the minority asserts that the free-
dom of the fairgoer to simply say "no" to canvassers minimized the legitimacy of
this interest. 101 S. Ct. at 2569 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
77. 101 S. Ct. at 2569.
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Emphasis was placed upon examination of Rule 6.05 from the
standpoint of each separate first amendment activity that was re-
stricted and the majority's failure to pursue such analysis. 78 The
opinion cited the existence of three types of restricted activity
with regard to the Rule: distribution of literature, sale of litera-
ture, and solicitation of donations.7 9 It was then stated, that al-
though the justification of preventing fraud and deception was
furthered by limitations upon sales and solicitations,8 0 similar re-
strictions upon the distribution of literature could not be as easily
justified.8 1
In relation to the majority's approval of the restriction upon dis-
tribution activities proposed by Rule 6.05, the dissent termed the
regulation "an overly intrusive means of achieving the State's in-
terest in crowd control .. *"82 The dissent noted that, contrary to
the Court's conclusion, effective alternative measures of a less re-
strictive nature were available to further the State's interest of
crowd control.83
The dissenting opinion highlighted the fact that each fairgoer,
regardless of affiliation with an organization or group, was free to
wander throughout the grounds campaigning, advocating causes
or giving speeches. 84 It hypothesized that on any given day 5,000
ISKCON members could attend the fair as patrons and be permit-
ted to communicate with whomever they wished.85 The natural
implication of this, the dissent intimated, was the arbitrariness of
a restriction designed to promote crowd control which allowed in-
dividuals to freely speak and move about yet prohibited the mere
act of handing out literature to fairgoers.86 The dissent concluded
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2568. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2569. The dissent reasoned that if sales and solicitation prac-
tices were confined to a booth, the State would have the opportunity to police
these areas for evidence of fraud or deception. Id.
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2569.
82. Id.
83. Id. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
84. 101 S. Ct. at 2569. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text. The opin-
ion noted that a state fair is certainly a proper forum for individuals and groups to
propagate views and information. 101 S. Ct. at 2569 n.2. "A state fair is truly a
marketplace of ideas and a public forum for the communication of ideas and infor-
mation." Id.
85. 101 S. Ct. at 2569.
86. Id. at 2570. The petitioners contended, however, that the distinction was
valid:
l]n a fairgrounds with thousands of people even a few roving solicitors
that the added confusion, if any, resulting from the distribution of
literature could not possibly magnify the problem of crowd con-
trol to an extent necessary to justify the Rule in question.87
It was conceded by the minority, however, that if the State had
recognized a reasonable concern that distribution of literature
would cause disorder in certain areas of the grounds, such as en-
trances and exits, then a narrowly drawn regulation to meet this
concern may have been justified.88 It was also noted that limita-
tions on the number of persons conducting distribution activities
could have been imposed within reason. 89 The dissent concluded,
however, that a total ban on all distribution activities of ISKCON
outside the confines of a rented booth was a clear violation of
their first amendment rights.90
The separate opinion of Justice Blackmun asserted the same
conclusion reached by the first dissent, that Rule 6.05 is unconsti-
tutional as applied to the distribution of literature but valid with
regard to sales and solicitations. However, his rationale for this
latter conclusion differed from that of Justice Brennan.91
Justice Blackmun's dissent relied upon the case of Village of
would stand out and attract curious crowds disproportionately large to
their numbers. Such random gatherings would occur more frequently
when it becomes known that the person who is the center of attention is
giving away or selling some products. In contrast, mere discussions
among people are not unique on the fairgrounds. Fairgoers would be
much more inclined to gather around a person who is giving away or sell-
ing products... than if that same person were merely carrying on a con-
versation with someone else.
Brief for Petitioner at 31, 101 S. Ct. 2559.
The dissent concluded that these assertions were unsupported in light of the al-
ready "robust and unrestrained" atmosphere created by thousands of wandering
fairgoers. 101 S. Ct. at 2570.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 2751. The opinion also noted the irony of the fact that the
State itself seemingly engaged in the same distribution practices expressly forbid-
den by Rule 6.05. Id. at 2571 n.5. Various affidavits stated that the individual who
received tickets at the fair gates, an employee of the fair, handed out to patrons
fliers alerting them to the possibility of being approached by roving solicitors. The
minority found it difficult to believe that the State could be concerned about an
activity which they themselves engage in also. Id.
88. 101 S. Ct. at 2571.
89. Id. See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
90. 101 S. Ct. at 2571-72. The dissent relied upon such cases as Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envir., 444 U.S. 620 (1979) and NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) for the proposition that broad prophylactic rules restricting
first amendment rights are suspect, and that such regulations must be drafted
with precision.
The dissent also took exception to the majority's assertion that ISKCON's prac-
tice of Sankirtan deserved no special constitutional protection. 101 S. Ct. at 2569
n.3. See also note 57 supra and accompanying text, It was noted that regulation of
religious rituals such as Sankirtan should be given a high level of scrutiny. 101 S.
Ct. at 2569 n.3. See notes 127-37 infra and accompanying text.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 2572.
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Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment92 to stress his
dissatisfaction with the State's interest in protecting fairgoers
from fraud and deception as justification for Rule 6.05's restriction
on sales and solicitations. 93 Justice Blackmun referred to the
Schaumburg holding which proclaimed that a state interest in
preventing fraud or deception in solicitation practices may only
be protected by narrowly drawn regulations which do not neglect
the existence of less intrusive measures.94 Applying this princi-
ple to the instant case, the opinion inferred that measures such as
policing the fairgrounds for fraud could be implemented as an al-
ternative to the harshness of Rule 6.05.95 The opinion stressed
further, however, that restrictions upon sales and solicitation ac-
tivities, although not supportive of a fraud prevention rational, do
maintain the State's interest in crowd control and safety.96 A dis-
tinction between sales, solicitation and distribution in terms of
the degree of crowd disruption caused by each, led the dissent to
hold that a restriction upon distribution of literature would not be
justified, but that such a restriction upon sales and solicitation
would be warranted.97
V. THE AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The Heffron majority proclaimed that in order for Rule 6.05 to
be sustained under constitutional scrutiny it must be found to be
necessary for the protection of a significant governmental inter-
est.98 Traditionally, a variety of terms used to characterize the na-
ture of the interest sought to be maintained, have been employed
92. 444 U.S. 620 (1979). Schaumburg involved an attack upon an ordinance
which prohibited door-to-door or on-street solicitation of funds by organizations
which did not use a minimum of 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes.
93. 101 S. Ct. at 2572.
94. Id. The less drastic measures emphasized in Schaumburg included disclo-
sure provisions and penal laws designed to thwart fraudulent misrepresentations.
444 U.S. at 637-38.
95. 101 S. Ct. at 2572. In the instant case, the task of policing the fairgrounds
to insure against fraudulent practices would have been easier since members of
ISKCON had offered to wear identification tags. Id.
96. 101 S. Ct. at 2572.
97. Id. at 2572-73. The opinion explained that the mere act of distribution did
not require the recipient to stop in order to receive literature. In contrast, sales
and solicitation practices require the fairgoer to stop and exchange money, which
could result in unforseen confusion. Id.
98. 101 S. Ct. at 2565. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
by the Court.99 Whatever the description utilized, it has been
generally understood that in the case of regulating first amend-
ment rights, a higher level of judicial scrutiny is required. 00 Rec-
ognition of crowd control and public safety objectives as
supportive of this elevated standard is found in many of the cases
cited by the Heifron Courtl01 and is utilized to illustrate the com-
pelling nature of the problem. It is clear that when the safety and
control of a public body appears to be in jeopardy, regulations
upon free speech and expression may be employed to remedy the
problem. 0 2 It is also evident, however, that such hazards clearly
must be seen to exist and that mere risks of public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest will not justify the implementation of free
speech restrictions. 0 3
The Heffron Court concluded that a policy of confining sales, so-
licitation, and distribution activities to designated areas furthered
the State's objective of control and safety of fair patrons, and,
thus, served a significant state interest. 04 It appears that the
Court recognized and applied the correct standard of review to
the case, yet inappropriately concluded that the asserted govern-
99. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (compelling state interest);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) (strong state interest); Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (paramount state interest).
100. The Court has stated that:
There are various "liberties,". .. which require that infringing legislation
be given closer judicial scrutiny, not only with respect to existence of a
purpose and the means employed, but also with respect to the importance
of the purpose itself relative to the invaded interest. Some interests
would appear almost impregnable to invasion, such as the freedoms of
speech .... and religion....
Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 548 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1959).
101. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1971); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290, 301-02 (1950); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1938).
102. Id.
103. It is clear that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dus. Comm'n School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). "Particular expressive activity
could not be prohibited because of a 'mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint .... '" Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1971) (quoting 393 U.S. at 508). See also Termi-
niello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948) in which an ordinance prohibiting activity which
could result in public anger, dispute, unrest, or disturbance was found to be viola-
tive of the petitioner's first amendment rights. In Terminiello, the petitioner was
"vigorously, if not viciously, criticiz [ing] various political and racial groups." Id. at
3. This conduct did in fact create crowd disturbance. Id. at 1. The Court, however,
concluded that the restriction upon such behavior was invalid. By contrast, in the
Heffron case, a far less provocative form of expression resulted in a finding that
such expression may be restricted.
104. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
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mental interests in support of that standard necessitated the re-
tention of Rule 6.05.
B. Significance of the State's Interest
As the facts of the opinion clearly indicate, the Minnesota State
Fair is a diverse marketplace with a robust and generally unre-
strained atmosphere. 05 With an average of 160,000 patrons at-
tending the fair on any given weekend day 0 6 and their movement
restricted to a relatively small area, 07 it is obvious that the event
is marked by an air of confusion and disorder which clearly could
not be any more complicated by the relaxation of the booth
restriction.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his separate opinion,108 all
individuals attending the fair were free to move about the crowd
in an unrestricted manner, speaking and communicating in any
reasonable fashion, yet the moment these individuals began sell-
ing or distributing literature, or soliciting donations within the
crowd, they became subject to arrest for violating Rule 6.05.109 It
seems that the Court has delineated a clearly arbitrary means to
justify its interest in crowd control by recognizing a contact with a
person marked by a transfer of money or materials as promoting
disruption or danger.1lO
The Heffron Court seemed to neglect the element of free will of
the fair patron. R is clear that a person who is not willing to be
subjected to the speeches and chants characterizing the practice
of Sankirtan is not likely to be interested in obtaining literature
or making donations."' In this situation the patron will simply
pass by showing little interest. In the same light, one who is re-
ceptive to the spoken message conveyed by the Krishnas will
more than likely be interested in obtaining further information on
105. See notes 12, 84-85 supra and accompanying text. 101 S. Ct. 2570.
106. 101 S. Ct. at 2561.
107. Id.
108. 101 S. Ct. 2568.
109. Id. at 2570. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
110. Justice Blackmun's assertion that sales and solicitation practices promote
crowd disruption while distribution activities do not, solely on the basis of the fact
that the former activities require a person to stop and exchange literature or
money, 101 S. Ct. at 2572-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), appears to be unfounded.
A patron may, while stopping to receive and/or examine literature being handed
out, cause just as great of a disruption as if he were paying for such literature.
111. See 101 S. Ct. 2569 n.1.
the group. The moment an interested patron stops to listen, the
feared "disruption" occurs. The degree of disruption in both situ-
ations would be unaltered by the fact that the individual relating
the message is also selling or distributing literature or soliciting
funds. The important factor is that the fair patron has stopped.
Whether it be to exchange money or ideas has little to do with the
degree of crowd disruption. No facts were presented in Heffron
which would indicate that actual congestion of the crowd flow
would result from allowing sales, solicitation, and distribution
practices to prevail in the mainstream of the fair. Without a
showing of such facts, the Rule in question should not have been
upheld.112
The Heffron Court further stipulated that the State's interest in
providing for the safety of fair patrons supported the retention of
Rule 6.05.113 The Court's justification for this conclusion was a
consideration of the special attributes of the fairgrounds114 and a
conclusion that safety demands viewed in light of such character-
istics required that canvassing practices be restricted to desig-
nated areas.115 However, the Court stopped there. Similar to its
relatively unsubstantiated analysis of crowd control as a valid
government interest, the opinion offered little or no discussion of
how, in light of the special attributes of the fairgrounds, the prac-
tice of offering literature or soliciting donations presented a sub-
stantial threat to public safety.1 6 It is difficult to understand how
112. International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 444 (2nd
Cir. 1981).
The facts merely pointed to the number of people in attendance at the fair and
the size of the area to which they were confined. The Court drew the inference
that such conditions would promote crowd congestion and danger should the
booth restriction be relaxed, but offered no relevant facts to substantiate its asser-
tion, such as evidence of generally unrestrained or dangerous characteristics of
ISKCON members or particular activities or customs of the fair itself which could
result in dangei or disruption if canvassing groups were allowed free movement.
See 101 S. Ct. at 2570.
113. 101 S. Ct. at 2565. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. In this
context, the Court also asserted the interest of crowd convenience as further justi-
fication for the Rule. The cases clearly refute the validity of this interest with ref-
erence to first amendment restrictions. See note 103 supra and accompanying
text.
114. 101 S. Ct. at 2565. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
115. In relation to this assertion, the Court's rejection of respondent's analogy
of city streets and the fairgrounds involved, see notes 47-52 supra and accompany-
ing text, must be questioned. The majority inexplicably based its treatment of the
analogy on the idea that the State Fair presented a greater safety hazard than
would the nation's highways. See note 51 supra. It is difficult to understand how
the urgent need for order and organization on city streets and the drastic implica-
tions of traffic disruption can be downplayed in such a manner.
116. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. One can infer from the major-
ity opinion that the Court perceives stops initiated by such practices as resulting
in a dangerous situation created by crowd congestion. Yet the Court offers no sug-
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such activities, even when conducted amidst thousands of
fairgoers, could create a kind of public hazard not already present
in such a context.1l 7
C. Less Intrusive Measures
As previously noted, the Heffron majority assigned little weight
to the fact that various less drastic alternatives to the booth re-
striction existed.118 The opinion simply concluded that in light of
the size of the group seeking free movement within the fair-
grounds, such measures would be ineffective.1l 9 The Court
seemed to ignore the significance of the requirement 20 and ne-
glected the alternatives without examining their effectiveness in
dealing with the asserted problem.
It seems clear that one proper and justifiable alternative to the
booth restriction would have been a limitation on the number of
persons given access to the fair for purposes of distributing or
selling literature or soliciting donations. 121 This measure would
have directly attacked the problem of overzealous individuals
causing disruptions of various kinds at the fair and would auto-
matically have remedied the matter cited by the Court as its ra-
tionale for finding such measures ineffective: the inability of less
restrictive alternatives to adequately cope with a group of the size
considered.122 These and other less drastic means have been ei-
ther implemented or judicially imposed in various cases dealing
with ISKCON members1 23 and for this reason could have been
gestion as to the types of risks or dangers faced, or other substantiation for these
fears.
117. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
119. 101 S. Ct. at 2567. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
120. See note 61 supra. There are many cases which provide an analogous fac-
tual situation to the instant case yet which conclude that less restrictive measures
should in fact be imposed in place of the broad restriction under attack. See, e.g.,
444 U.S. 620, where a statute aimed at prohibiting fraudulent practices, see notes 92
and 94 supra, was held to be overbroad in light of various less drastic means to
deal with the problem. In this situation it could just as easily have been argued by
the Court that these alternatives could not have effectively been implemented in
light of the large numbers of solicitors in the area and the difficulty in locating and
prosecuting violators. See 101 S. Ct. at 2572.
121. International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 84
(1980). See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
122. 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
123. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667
(7th Cir. 1979) (injunction granted to ISKCON provided: 1) all members wore
identification cards; 2) all members refrained from physical contact of patrons; and
utilized in the instant case.124 If implemented in a reasonable
manner, the overriding benefit of these less intrusive means is the
accomplishment of the government purpose without a substantial
impairment to first amendment protections. 25 Therefore, in light
of the high level of protection traditionally afforded free speech
guarantees, 126 the implementation of such measures must always
be given proper consideration.
D. Freedom of Religion
In its analysis of the State's interest in providing safe and or-
derly movement of the crowd, the Court emphasized that the in-
clusion of the practices associated with Sankirtan as an integral
part of the Krishna religion did not entitle its members to an ex-
emption from Rule 6.05.127 Examination of this assertion entails
recognition of the two aspects of the freedom of religion guaran-
tee of the first amendment. The first aspect concerns an individ-
ual's conscious choice to adhere to certain religious convictions,
the freedom to believe.128 The second aspect involves the free ex-
ercise of conduct pursuant to these beliefs, the freedom to act.129
The Court has recognized the sanctity of the first concept and has
not permitted its restriction.130 It has, however, authorized the
regulation of the free exercise of religious beliefs when such con-
duct or action poses some clear and substantial threat to public
safety, peace, or general welfare.131 In the same respect, it has
3) all members refrained from contacting unconsenting persons waiting in lines);
International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (rule restricting the number of ISKCON members to ten and prohibiting
various activities within 15 feet of certain areas); International Soc'y for Krishna
Consc. Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding restrictions on dis-
tribution and solicitation practices of ISKCON in certain areas of an airport and
prohibiting such activity during emergency situations).
124. The Minnesota Supreme Court pointed out, however, that the measures
taken will, of course, depend upon the nature of the forum involved. 299 N.W.2d at
84 n.10. It appears that placing limitations on numbers of people in the present
situation would be the most logical and equitable measure, as the problem sought
to be remedied originates from overcrowding.
125. "[A] city should aim its regulation at the act of obstruction itself rather
than prohibiting solicitations . .. based on its desire to prevent obstruction and
provide for the free flow of traffic." Jones, supra note 16, at 57.
126. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
127. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. There was no dispute in this
case over the validity of the claim that Sankirtan is in fact a religious ritual of
Krishna Consciousness. 101 S. Ct. at 2569 n.3.
128. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
129. Id.
130. Id. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
131. Sherbet, 374 U.S. at 402-03; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04. In his separate
opinion in Heffron, Justice Brennan seemed to infer that the free exercise of reli-
gious convictions is protected from government regulation to the same extent that
the freedom to believe is protected. 101 S. Ct. at 2569-70 n.3. He cited Wisconsin v.
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been stated that interests of mere public comfort and conven-
ience will not, by themselves, justify intrusion upon the pursuit of
important religious objectives.1 32
It is evident that the Heffron Court recognized the fundamental
nature of the freedom to exercise religious beliefs with respect to
the practice of Sankirtan,133 but it concluded that the urgent in-
terests asserted by the State precluded the interest of ISKCON
members to conduct their activities. As previously noted, how-
ever, it appears that the Court exaggerated the immediacy of the
interests sought to be protected by the curtailment of ISKCON's
religious expression134 and erroneously concluded that the prac-
tice of Sankirtan should not be protected from government regu-
lation.135 The difficulty in the assertion that Sankirtan
substantially threatens the proposed interests to be protected has
already been demonstrated. 136 Therefore, it must be concluded
that the free exercise of the practice may, at most, be viewed as a
minor inconvenience or imposition of a nature which could not
rightfully justify its restriction. 37 For these reasons, it appears
that the Court misapplied the principles associated with the free
exercise of religious beliefs to the relevant facts of this case.
VI. IMPACT OF THE CASE
The ruling announced in Heffron puts to rest the unbounded
confusion in the realm of restrictions upon sales, distribution, and
solicitation activities of organizational members in public
places.138 The significance of the decision in resolving an unset-
tled area of the law is clearly illustrated by the extensive media
coverage surrounding the case139 and the far reaching effects of
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) as support for the proposition that there are certain ar-
eas of religious conduct which are beyond the scope of government intrusion. Id.
However, a careful reading of Yoder will reveal the Court's recognition of the fact
that under certain circumstances where public health and safety are involved, the
free exercise of religion may validly be curtailed. 406 U.S. at 220.
132. Giannella, supra note 4, at 1398.
133. "[First amendment] protection is [not] lost because . .. contributions or
gifts are solicited in the course of propagating the faith." 101 S. Ct. at 2563.
134. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
135. Id. See 101 S. Ct. at 2566.
136. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
137. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
139. On the evening of the Court's ruling, the issue was the topic of discussion
on the ABC television network news program Nightline.
its holding. It is clear that the reach of the decision will extend to
most public areas and will serve to limit representatives of all
groups involved in practices similar to those conducted by ISK-
CON members.140 The general effect of the case will be that, sub-
ject to certain specific criteria,141 the states may constitutionally
allow the confinement of literature sales and distribution, and
fund solicitation to designated areas within a public forum.
The conditions which necessitated the imposition of the booth
restriction at the Minnesota State Fair will likely be viewed by
the Court to exist in a variety of public forums. The objectives of
providing adequate crowd movement and safety can be valid con-
siderations in almost all places which are open to the general
public. The decision's impact will surely be felt in such areas as
airports, 42 highway rest stops143 and various other centers of ac-
tivity. It is within these settings that the need for regulation is
most often assertedl4 and that the Court's ruling will have cer-
tain impact.
To further comprehend the ramifications of the decision, it may
be helpful to consider a hypothetical situation analogous to the
one presented by Heffron and to venture a prediction as to the
Court's probable reaction to the circumstances in question. Con-
sider the plight of the hypothetical West International Airport.
For several years, the directors and administrators of West have
been bombarded with hundreds of complaints concerning the
overzealous and annoying practices of the association known as
the National Organization for the Repeal of Gambling Restric-
tions (NORGR). Concern over nationwide statutes which
criminalize the act of gambling has led the members of NORGR
to flood American airport facilities. Their goal is to communicate
their point of view to as many travellers as possible and to per-
suade these people to contribute to, or join their crusade. In pur-
140. There is no indication that the ruling will be narrowly applied to only reli-
gious orgnizations. The case specifically proclaims equality of treatment of com-
mercial and noncommercial groups. 101 S. Ct. at 2566.
141. The traditional requirements that the regulation serve a significant govern-
ment interest, be content-neutral in its application, and be narrowly tailored to
achieve the interests asserted, are still required.
142. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809
(5th Cir. 1979); International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263
(7th Cir. 1978).
143. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Hays, 438 F. Supp.
1077 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
144. "[WJe are not unmindful, as anyone cannot be who has travelled through
a major airport facility in recent years, that practitioners of Sankirtan have been
regarded as annoying and often downright irritating by those they approach." In-
ternational Soc'y for Krishna Consc. Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 670-71 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). The Heffiron decision sought to allow these public
facilities to remedy this problem.
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suit of their objectives, NORGR members have been known to
move freely in airports greeting unsuspecting individuals with
pamphlets which espouse their beliefs and distributing small gifts
such as playing cards and dice. Other reported practices of the
group include the fastening of pins and buttons upon members of
the public and persistent and often unruly physical contact. In
response to the public outcry for alleviation of the often bother-
some practices associated with the members of NORGR, the State
authorities operating West Airport have enacted Airport Order
Regulation 14-77. The regulation provides in relevant part:
Any person who, upon entering West International Airport, confronts or
otherwise subjects any individual to promotional activities involving dis-
tribution or sale of any merchandise or written materials, or solicits any
form of financial contribution within such airport shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and subject to prosecution. Such enumerated activities shall
not be considered a misdemeanor and shall not require prosecution where
such are conducted from designated areas within the airport approved by
the airport commission.
The members of NORGR have brought a class action suit
against the airport commission on behalf of themselves and the
various other organizations similarly situated, alleging that Air-
port Order Regulation 14-77 violates the first and fourteenth
amendments.
In reviewing this hypothetical case, the Court will undoubtedly
take notice of the nature of the public forum involved and relate
this observation to the governmental interests to be supported by
Regulation 14-77.145 Recognition of the generally crowded and
confused environment of an international airport and concern
over the need to protect the public in such an atmosphere from
undue crowd congestion and disruption will certainly persuade
the Court to uphold the regulation.146 The Court will necessarily
consider less restrictive measures to combat the problem,147 but
in light of Heffron, the Court will inevitably conclude that the only
viable action to be taken is the confinement of NORGR's activities
to a limited area.'4 With respect to the nature of the organization
involved, the Court will find no basis for ruling differently than it
did in Heffron simply because NORGR is not a religious organiza-
tion and its activities are not founded upon religious convic-
145. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 63 and 64 supra and accompanying text.
tions. 149 The general effect of these activities upon the public at
large, the Court will conclude, is substantially the same as that of
nonsecular practices.
With its Heffron decision, the Court has at its disposal a worka-
ble standard by which to rule upon the regulation in question,
with regard to organizational practices similar to that of ISKCON.
Prior to the Heffron ruling, no such standard existed.
Viewing the impact of Heffron from the perspective of the par-
ties whose activities will be curtailed by the ruling, it becomes
clear that the most resounding effect of the decision will be felt by
organizations who, like ISKCON, purport to ritualize the canvass-
ing process as an important religious activity. With respect to
these groups, it appears that confinement of their practices, as au-
thorized by the ruling, will create in effect a virtual circumvention
of the organizational purposes behind the practices involved, 150
and possibly signal the termination of such conduct in public
places.151
The decision will additionally impact upon secular organiza-
tions involved in canvassing practices. Although the activities
practiced by these groups are not related to asserted religious be-
fiefs, their members depend upon crowd contact in public forums
to raise funds or communicate an idea.152 Heffron's extension of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions allowing the total
confinement of these activities will certainly impede achievement
of the objectives of these organizations and seriously restrict the
effectiveness of their efforts in the public forum.
With respect to the Court's treatment of the freedom of religion
issue presented by ISKCON's practice of Sankirtan,15 3 the Court's
149. See note 38 and 40 supra and accompanying text.
150. In the case of ISKCON members for example, it was asserted that the
proper performance of Sankirtan necessarily involves the close proximity to and
free movement among large numbers of individuals. 101 S. Ct. 2567. See also In-
ternational Soc'y for Krishna Consc., Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414, 418-19 (S.D.
Ohio 1977). In allowing such activity to be confined to a small area, the Court im-
poses severe limitations upon the exposure necessary to properly achieve the
objectives of the practice. See note 71 supra.
151. One is led to believe that in cases such as Heffron, where the proper pur-
suit of conduct is tied to essential beliefs of the organization, other more amicable
forums will be sought by the group to conduct their activities, rather than to sub-
mit themselves to the confinement regulations now authorized. "[S ] ankirtan can-
not be practiced from a booth." Hynes v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 478 F. Supp. 9,
11 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
152. It is evident that charitable organizations such as the American Red Cross
and the American Cancer Society, whose very existence depends to a large extent
upon public donations, will be gravely affected by the ruling, as it may serve to
severely limit the numbers of people who may be contacted by these groups at
public gatherings.
153. See notes 127-37 supra and accompanying text.
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conclusion may reasonably be construed as creating a new stan-
dard by which the extent of regulation of the freedom to act pur-
suant to religious convictions may be determined. It appears that
in future cases involving activities of religious organizations, the
courts will be authorized to accord a lower level of significance to
the religious nature of organizational activities and allow less sub-
stantial interests to demand governmental regulation of these
activities.154
From a practical standpoint, the Heffron decision will necessar-
ily signify the reduction of what has come to be regarded by many
as an irritating and annoying distraction.15 5 Ultimately, however,
the choice of whether or not to be subjected to an offered
message or to engage in any form of exchange with organizational
representatives is necessarily a decision to be made by individu-
als and cannot be affected by the persistence of such
representatives.
VII. CONCLUSION
Hefifron represents the expansion by the Court of the permissi-
ble limits of time, place, and manner restrictions upon organiza-
tions asserting the right to free crowd contact in a public forum.
The decision marks the Court's continued unwillingness to sacri-
fice substantial government objectives for the free exercise of first
amendment rights. The prevalent recognition of the overriding in-
terests presented by the need to protect the public welfare illus-
trates the basis for the decision and the expectation of its
continued validity.
This article has explored the necessary criteria for valid time,
place, and manner restriction upon first amendment protections
and has examined their validity with respect to the members of
the Krishna religion. Through this analysis, it has been the au-
thor's intention to provide an overview of similar constitutional
actions and to explore their application to the instant case as well
as to provide some indication as to the circumstances necessary
to sustain such regulations.
Insofar as this article has dealt primarily with an organization
154. The Heffron Court authorized the restriction of the first amendment activi-
ties of ISKCON to uphold what clearly seemed to be an interest of mere public
comfort and convenience. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
155. See note 144 supra.
which is clothed with a certain degree of public controversy, the
processes utilized by the Court in reaching its decision appear to
reflect, to some extent, that controversy and the public's attitude
toward the proselytizing activities of that group.156 In the au-
thor's opinion the decision proclaimed in Hefon must be care-
fully scrutinized in light of these attitudes to ascertain the
fairness and objectivity of the Court's conclusion.15 7
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156. Id.
157. "Distaste for what is being expressed, and often absolute revulsion, appear
to be the hallmarks of the exercise of First Amendment rights and probably are
the necessary contexts in which the preservation of those rights can be firmly as-
sured." 600 F.2d at 671.
